After a 100 days, who is the victor in the Ukraine war?

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine is now over 100 days old, and with an outright victory most unlikely, Moscow has had to whittle down its military goals to essentially appear as the victor. Mr Putin’s military has failed to either capture the bulk of resource-rich Ukraine; or even topple Ukraine’s government, led by a ‘Nazi’ leadership, that he had claimed. What he has done is created a humanitarian crisis and global inflation- as Ukraine was Europe’s grain basket – and created a new divide between Europe and a Russia-led east bloc. This in turn has re-energised Europe to hike up its spending on its defence and given NATO – which had been reduced to an ineffective body - a new purpose. Moreover, the invasion has brought the US clearly back into a global leadership role and left Russia isolated.

Many have thus asked why has a country as militarily powerful as Russia, failed? There are no simple answers, but here are some. To begin with, the Russians had little idea about how the Ukrainians would fight back. And what a fight back, they’ve put up indeed. This reaffirms my view that it is impossible to defeat people who are willing to die for their beliefs. They did so essentially to resist Moscow’s agenda of the ‘Russification’ of their country. No doubt, the active support from the US and the EU has helped Ukraine to stall Russia’s advances, but this has come at a great cost. It has left millions homeless, thousands dead and caused colossal damage to property. But even then, Russia’s invasion is far from over.

Apart from the massive supplies of high-end precision-guided weapon systems – like the Javelin anti-tank missiles, top attack drones to destroy armoured columns and Stinger anti-helicopter missiles – coupled with hit and run attacks on Russia’s long line of road-bound military convoys that didn’t adopt tactical deployments by using cross country terrain, that mechanised forces are designed for, have shown Russian forces in very poor light. Moreover, most frontline Russian units had about 25 per cent conscripts, who were only too willing to surrender given half a chance. And there was little coordination between battalion-sized battle groups and their higher military formations. Even then, it took Moscow more than two months to announce an overall commander of military operations!

Clearly, Russia has shown how not to implement such a campaign, which it has called a ‘special military operation’. Moscow’s sense of hubris or over-confidence has led to a botched-up operation that Mr Putin will find hard to justify as a success, despite the Russian occupation of areas from north to southeast Ukraine, including the entire coast along the Sea of Azov. Some of those areas like the Donbas region were controlled by separatists with strong linkages to Moscow. The question now is, what would it take for Putin to end his campaign? Would a ceasefire put an end to this 100-day war? Historically, countries have agreed to a ceasefire when they have an outright victory under their belt – as India did in 1971 after the fall of Dacca – or if a country finds it futile to fight on, as Japan did in 1945. The two warring sides – Russia and Ukraine – have neither.

However, in this war, apart from the two warring sides, there is a third major player in this game, and that is the US. Washington, say observers, is unlikely to rest till it has reduced Russia’s military standing – and with it, Mr Putin’s reputation - to a point of ineffectiveness, so that Moscow cannot militarily threaten to undertake another invasion of Europe again. Having had its military reputation destroyed most recently in Afghanistan, Mr Biden was looking for an opportunity to bounce back, and the war in Ukraine has given him just that opportunity. This war has also allowed the US to become – once again, after the Trump years – the leader of Europe, and has clipped the EU’s ambitions to be a power bloc on its own.

But the biggest gainer from the war over Ukraine is China. While Beijing had expected Russian forces to do a lot better in Ukraine, and to show the impotence of the Western world, the reverse has happened. This has led Beijing to recalibrate its expectations. But a weaker Putin would in fact suit China more. It would draw Moscow even closer to Beijing and give China access to Russia’s top-end military hi-tech weapon technologies – as Moscow is still a world leader in military systems – and will provide China unhindered access to Russia’s large oil and gas reserves. Both of which China needs to challenge the US, and the QUAD.

And while India has shown considerable diplomatic dexterity in handling its relations with the West, especially the US, even as New Delhi’s neutrality has annoyed many in western capitals, it has given India an opportunity to become the classic ‘swing state’. This would imply that India can further reinforce its neutral stance in the coming years, and take a position on geopolitical issues on a case-by-case basis because neither is the US position always right (as its past policies on Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan have shown) nor can India abandon its strong historical and military ties with Russia. Thus, the war over Ukraine has given India – with its rising economic quotient – the clearest opportunity to emerge as a neutral nation that'll make its own choices.